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Abstract Are risk preferences stable over time? To address this question we elicit
risk preferences from the same pool of subjects at two different moments in time. To
interpret the results, we use a Fechner stochastic choice model in which the revealed
preference of individuals is governed by some underlying preference, together with a
random error. We take cumulative prospect theory as the underlying preference model
(Kahneman and Tversky, Econometrica 47:263–292, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman,
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5:297–323, 1992). We observe that the aggregate
pattern of preferences is very similar in both sessions, and it matches the results
reported in the literature. Most subjects are risk averse for gains, and risk seeking for
losses. However, the subjects that jointly agree with the reflection effect of prospect
theory are around 50%. The percentage of individuals that change their responses
across sessions is quite high, 63%. Estimating the stochastic choice model we find
that 72% of the subjects have an underlying preference which agrees with the reflec-
tion effect of prospect theory. The remaining 28% are mainly classified as risk averse
for both gains and losses. The results reinforce the empirical validity of the reflection
effect. Deviations from the reflection effect can be attributed to noise, as well as to the
existence of a fraction of risk averse subjects.
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1 Introduction
Are risk preferences stable over time? In a world of rational decision makers, and
assuming no changes in the state of the world, risk preferences are supposed to be sta-
ble over time. More precisely, when asked the same question at sufficiently separated
moments in time, we expect most subjects to provide the same answer. Stability of
preferences need not be a desirable property in certain domains in which we might seek
variety. For instance, changing preferences might be driven by fashion in a changing
environment. Still, there might be a stable underlying preference for conformity/dis-
conformity to the current fashion. We would like to think that risk preferences fall in
this category of fundamental underlying preferences that define our personality and
identity.
Stability of risk preferences is also an assumption made when we elicit preferences
for subjects. In doing so, we believe we are learning something about that subject. In
areas such as financial investment, risk insurance, and health decision, clients are often
asked about their risk preferences. The recommendations the client receives hinge on
the assumption that risk preferences are stable.
It has been argued (Grether and Plott 1979) that several non-normative factors
induce subjects to change their preferences. These factors include the framing of
problems (Tversky 1969), compatibility effects (Lichtenstein and Slovic 1971), and
elicitation procedures (Hershey and Schoemaker 1985; Bostic et al. 1990). Berg et al.
(2005) also find evidence of changes in risk preferences as a function of the auction
mechanism employed. Therefore, it is well established that decisions are not neutral
to the response mode used to express the preference, and are labile and sensitive to
the way in which a problem is framed. Most research has focused on switches in
preferences due to slight changes in the experimental conditions.
Few studies have directly addressed the study of possible changes in preferences
when the subject is confronted with exactly the same decision at two separate moments
in time. Experiments in which subjects face similar choices were indirectly treated
by examining the test–retest reliability questions (Schoemaker and Hershey 1992;
Camerer 1989; Hey and Orme 1994; Ballinger and Wilcox 1997; Loomes and Sugden
1998). These studies find that, in the short term (less than one week), between one
quarter and one third of subjects express different responses when confronted twice
with the same set of choices.
There are some studies measuring risk attitudes in different sessions. In a study of
the risk attitudes of business executives, Wehrung et al. (1984) found a small positive
correlation of 0.36 for personal risk measures over a one-year interval. Smidts (1997)
measured the risk attitudes of 1000 Dutch Farmers, and found a 0.45 correlation in risk
attitudes in a one-year interval. Harrison et al. (2005) and Andersen et al. (2008) have
made the most direct attempts to study the stability of risk attitudes. Using a laboratory
experiment and a sample of the Danish population, Harrison and colleagues find that
preferences, in the gains domain, are quite stable over a 7-month and a 17-month time
separation, respectively.
This paper adds one more piece of evidence in the elicitation of risk preferences
in separate sessions. However, the novelty of our work is that we interpret the results
in light of a stochastic choice model. According to the model, a constant stimulus
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may be perceived with certain error and does not always produce the same reaction.
Hence, different answers to the same question are not incompatible with having some
underlying stable risk preferences. Our data allow us to estimate the distribution of
this underlying preference. Perhaps due to the influence of EU, previous evidence of
stability of preferences was restricted to the gains domain. Our work is also novel
in that we elicit risk preferences in both gains and losses. Hence, we can examine
the prevalence of risk preference in accordance with the reflection effect of prospect
theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).
To account for the instability of risk preferences over time, we use a stochastic
choice model (SCM) in which the revealed preference of individuals is governed by
some underlying preference, together with a random error. Our SCM is similar to
what Becker et al. (1963) call the Fechner model and has been used in the context of
theories of decision making under risk by Hey and Orme (1994). The SCM is easy to
estimate, yielding parameters that provide a nice interpretation and insight. The SCM
is capable of estimating the magnitude of the decision error, and the underlying pattern
of preference.
We adopt a simple Fechner model with an homoscedastic error term. At its face
value, such model may predict violations of elementary stochastic dominance, which
are hardly observed empirically. However, the model is appropriate to interpret our
data, which are generated from choices that are far from exhibiting stochastic domi-
nance. Buschena and Zilberman (2000) compare homoscedastic and heteroscedastic
error models. Blavatskyy (2006) and Blavatskyy (2007) introduce heteroscedastic
error models that avoid violations of stochastic dominance.
We highlight the following findings: (1) The error term is smaller in gains than
it is in losses. This finding is in agreement with previous research (Gonzalez et al.
2005; Lopes 1987) which argue that choices involving losses create more conflict and
cognitive effort, and hence are less stable. (2) The most common underlying pattern
of preference is given by the reflection effect of Prospect theory (risk averse for gains,
risk seeking for losses). The proportion of individuals that agree with this pattern is
significantly higher (72%) than the approximately 50% that has been found in the
literature on single-session elicitation (see average results in Table 2). (3) The other
common preference pattern (24%) is subjects who are risk averse on both domains,
which is the preference pattern assumed in many economic models of insurance and
portfolio investment.
The paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 reviews the reflection effect of cumulative
prospect theory and the empirical support found in the literature. Section 3 develops the
SCM. In Sect. 4 we design an experiment to elicit basic risk attitudes in two sessions
with the same subjects. The results allow us to estimate the proposed SCM model. We
use our model in Sect. 5 to make predictions. Finally, discussion and conclusions are
given in Sect. 6.
2 The reflection effect: theory and evidence
According to cumulative prospect theory (CPT), risk preferences are reference depen-
dent, i.e., the carrier of value is not the consequences measured in absolute wealth, but
the relative consequences of perceived gains and losses with respect to some reference
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point. CPT further stipulates the reflection effect: for event of moderate probability,
subjects are risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses. The reflection effect is
captured by a value function that is concave for gains and convex for losses. Cumula-
tive prospect theory also incorporates a probability weighting function that transforms
given probabilities into decision weights.
A decision maker that follows the reflection effect of CPT will behave as risk averse
for gains and risk seeking for losses of moderate to high probability. For gains and
losses of low probability, the pattern is reversed due to the effect of the probabil-
ity weighting function. In this paper, we will focus on risk attitudes for intermediate
probabilities.
In comparing our results with existing literature, we may identify a response (say
risk averse) with a claim on the curvature of the value function (concave). It is well
known that a concave value function can coexist with risk seeking preferences, because
of the influence of the probability weighting function. We use a method to elicit risk
preferences that minimizes the distorting impact of probability weighting. It is under
this proviso that in our discussion we identify risk preferences with the curvature of
the value function.
We elicit risk preferences for gains and losses separately. We have not elicited risk
preferences for mixed gambles. In the context of prospect theory, such elicitation could
be used to study the stability of the parameter of loss aversion (an abrupt change of
the slope of the value function at the reference point).
Throughout our classifications in the paper, A+ denotes the subjects who exhibit
risk aversion in the gains domain, N+ those that exhibit risk neutrality in the gains
domain, and S+ those that exhibit a risk seeking attitude in the gains domain. For
the losses domain, we use A−, N−, and S−, to denote subjects in the corresponding
categories, respectively.
The reflection effect of CPT is expected to hold for most decision makers. For
intermediate probabilities, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) found 88% of subjects as
being risk averse for gains and 87% of subjects as being risk seeking for losses. Results
from other studies shown in Table 1 confirm the findings of Tversky and Kahneman,
even though the percentages are not so strong.
The results of Table 1 are silent with respect to the joint pattern of preference in
both domains. The modal pattern (74% risk averse for gains and 64% risk seeking
for losses) does not tell us what fraction of subjects are both risk averse for gains and
risk seeking for losses. Few subsequent studies took note of this criticism (Hershey
and Schoemaker 1980) and reported joint preferences. We found four such studies,
summarized in Table 2. Table 2 completes the picture of Table 1: While the risk
averse–risk seeking pattern is the most prominent, the proportion of subjects that are
simultaneously risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses falls to 47%. This
weakens the claim that the reflection effect holds for a great majority of people.
3 The stochastic choice model
Assume decision makers express their underlying preferences, but with error. Errors in
reporting one’s true preference tend to act against the modal preference. For instance,
if the reflection effect is the modal preference, then random errors will decrease the
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Table 1 The reflection effect in the literature
Study Gains Losses
A+ N+ S+ A− N− S− n
Abdellaoui (2000)a 58 19 22 23 29 49 32
ABPb 71 4 25 8 23 69 48
Fennema and Van Assen (1998) CEc 83 0 17 5 5 91 64
Fishburn and Kochenberger (1979) 53 7 40 33 7 60 30
Laury and Holt (2005)d 71 9 20 41 6 53 66
Schoemaker (1990) 76 7 17 30 11 59 214
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) 88 2 10 6 7 87 25
Weighted average 74 7 20 24 11 64 481
Values are percentages
a Subjects classified with mixed preferences are excluded
b ABP Abdellaoui et al. (2007). Subjects classified as mixed are shown as linear
c CE Refers to the results of the certainty equivalence elicitation
d Only the results for gambles with intermediate probabilities were considered
Table 2 Joint risk attitudes in the gains and losses domain
Gain–losses domain A+ A− A+N− A+S− N+ A− N+N− N+S− S+ A− S+N− S+S− n
Abdellaoui (2000)a 13 13 40 9 0 12 3 9 0 32
Schoemaker (1990) 22 6 48 1 4 2 7 1 9 214
ABP 2 15 54 0 2 2 6 6 13 48
L&H (2000)b 30 2 39 3 3 3 8 1 11 66
Weighted average 20 7 47 2 3 3 7 2 9 360
Values are percentages
a Subjects classified with mixed preferences are excluded
b L&H (2000) Laury and Holt (2005). Only the results for gambles with intermediate probabilities were
considered
observed support for the reflection effect. To illustrate, consider that the true underlying
preference of all subjects is given by the reflection effect. However, due to the random
error component of the evaluation, any given individual has a 74% chance of revealing
his true risk averse preference in the gains domain, and a 64% chance of revealing
his true risk seeking preference in the losses domain (percentages are taken from
Table 1). Further, assume that the random error is independent in both choices. Then,
it follows that the chance of revealing a pattern fully consistent with the reflection
effect is 74%*64% = 47%. This is precisely the response pattern shown in Table 2.
Error models, or stochastic choice models, can take several forms: from the intro-
duction of a noise term in the utility evaluation to random selection of preference
orderings [for a summary, see Suppes et al. (1989)]. The combination of variable
behavior and stable patterns of choices goes back to the idea of Fechnner’s psycho-
physical measurement of sensory error. The utility of a choice is computed using
some underlying preference function plus an error term. This necessarily involves
an assumption about the errors made by the subjects. Two such assumptions are a
random error [e.g., Machina (1985); Sopher and Narramore (2000); Hey and Orme
(1994)] or a “tremble” in the decision process [e.g.,Camerer and Ho (1994); Harless
and Camerer (1994)]. Ballinger and Wilcox (1997) ran a test of both models and the
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data they collected rejects the tremble model but not the random error model. Here,
we follow the random error approach.
We modify Fechnner’s basic model to account for the choice between two pros-
pects A and S, and include the option of being neutral between the two. The
neutral option can be interpreted as either indifference between A and S, or, rather,
lack of preference in either direction. The first interpretation assumes that decision
makers have complete preferences, whereas the second interpretation assumes that
decision makers may have incomplete preferences. As we cannot experimentally
separate these two interpretations, we classify as risk neutral those subjects who
choose the option “A and S are the same.” In our experiments, A and S will be
lotteries with the same expected value, and hence “neutral” is interpreted as “risk
neutral.”
Our SCM model has one error term ε and two parameters,  and θ > 0. is the
underlying utility difference between the most and least preferred alternative, and θ is
a utility threshold value to determine whether subjects can discriminate between the
alternatives. The model operates as follows: Suppose a subject has a true risk prefer-
ence type, say, A is preferred over S, and hence has an underlying utility gap in favor
of A, denoted by . However, the perceived utility U is
U =  + ε, (1)
The subject will choose indifference between A and S if |U | ≤ θ , will choose A
if U > θ , and will choose S if U < −θ . We will also assume that errors are nor-
mally distributed, with zero mean. Without loss of generality, one can further assume
a standard deviation of one, as the units of  can be properly defined relative to the
error.
Therefore,  measures the utility of the preferred alternative relative to the size of
the error. In this vein,  is similar to a t-value, as it measures utility in units of stan-
dard deviation. The higher the , the higher the probability of selecting the alternative
preferred according to one’s own type. Hence, we propose  as a measure of stability
of preferences.
We assume that subjects have underlying preferences corresponding to given types.
We use lowercase letters a+, n+ s+, a−, n−, and s− to denote the three possible types
for each domain. For instance, a+ stands for risk averse for gains. Similarly, n−
stands for risk neutral for losses, and so on. τ+ ∈ {a+, n+, s+} denotes the gains type,
τ− ∈ {a−, n−, s−} the losses type, and τ = (τ+, τ−) the full type. There are nine
possible types, and τ = (a+, s−) corresponds to the reflective type. Accordingly, we
introduce p(τ ), which denotes the fraction of subjects of type τ .
The answer to the single choice question Q1 shown in Fig. 2 allows us to classify
subject’s responses as A+, N+, and S+. Here, A+ represents the less risky alternative
(preferred by a+ types) and S+ the riskier alternative (preferred by s+ types) in the
sense of mean-preserving increase in risk. Similarly, the single choice question Q2
shown in Fig. 2 allow us to classify subject’s responses as A−, N−, and S−.
We will consider +,− and θ+, θ− as the domain specific values of  and θ ,
respectively. +, for instance, is the utility difference between the most and least
preferred alternative in Q1. If one has in mind CPT as the decision model, then
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+ = |V (A+) − V (S+)|, where V is the evaluation function of CPT. + could
be obtained from any other decision model producing a numerical evaluation of alter-
native pairs. See Hey and Orme (1994) for a full characterization of other decision
models. By definition, these four parameters are non-negative.
We will make the restrictive assumption that  and θ are constant across types.
For instance, types a+ and s+ have the same utility difference between A+ and S+,
namely, ++ and −+, respectively. This assumption is necessary to have a parsi-
monious model with few parameters that can be estimated. A pre-condition to justify
this assumption is that both A+ and S+ have the same expected value.
Under these assumptions of the SCM, the following proposition yields the proba-






1 if τ+ = a+
0 if τ+ = n+





1 if τ− = a−
0 if τ− = n−
−1 if τ− = s−
then, in the gains domain, the probabilities of choosing A+, N+, or S+ for different
types are ( stands for cdf of a standard normal distribution)
P
(
A+|τ+) = 1 − (θ+ − β+τ +)
P(N+|τ+) = (θ+ − βτ+) − (−θ+ − β+τ +) (2)
P(S+|τ+) = (−θ+ − β+τ +).
Similarly, in the losses domain,
P
(
A−|τ−) = 1 − (θ− − β−τ −)
P(N−|τ−) = (θ− − β−τ −) − (−θ− − β−τ −) (3)
P
(
S−|τ−) = (−θ− − β−τ −).
Proof Consider a type a+ subject facing the choice between A+, N+, and S+. As
the most and least preferred alternatives are A+ and S+, respectively, the subject’s
perceived utility of A+ over S+ is given by + + ε+. If ε+ ∼ N (0, 1), then the
probability that a type a+ chooses the prospect A+ is
P(A+|a+) = P(+ + ε+ > θ+) = P(ε+ > −+ + θ+) = 1 − (θ+ − +).
This probability corresponds to the light gray area P(A+|a+)in Fig. 1. The probability
of being neutral between A+ and S+ is
P(N+|a+)= P(−+ − θ+ ≤ ε+ ≤ −+ + θ+)=(θ+ −+) − (−θ+ −+),
as indicated in the blank area P(N+|a+) in Fig. 1. Finally, the probability of choosing
S+ is
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Fig. 1 Representations of the probabilities that a subject type a+ choose a gamble A+, S+, or being
indifferent between A+ and S+
P(S+|a+) = P(+ + ε+ < −θ+) = P(ε+ < −+ − θ+) = (−θ+ − +),
as shown in the dark gray area P(S+|a+) in Fig. 1. Given the definitions of β+τ and
β−τ , one can check that the perceived utility difference between the most and least
preferred alternative is given by:
U+τ = β+τ +τ + ε+ and U−τ = β−τ −τ + ε−. (4)
Using this, and the assumption of normality, we can calculate, for each type, choice,
and domain the 18 relevant probabilities. These probabilities are summarized in Eqs. 2
and 3. unionsq
Let R+t ∈ {A+, N+, S+} and R−t ∈ {A−, N−, S−} denote the response of a subject
for the gains and losses choices in session t, t = 1, 2. Subjects make a total of four















p(τ ) × P(R+2 , R−2 |R+1 , R−1 , τ ) × P(R+1 , R−1 |τ) (5)
Taking the logarithm of (5) yields the loglikelihood of a given answer by a given
subject. Assuming, as usual, that answers from different individuals are independent,
we obtain the loglikelihood function of the entire sample as the sum of individual
loglikelihoods. We denote this loglikelihood function by L(+,−, θ+, θ−, p(τ )).
The MLE estimations are the parameter values +,−, θ+, θ−, together with the
probabilities p(τ ), that maximize L .
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If the time interval lapsed between sessions is long enough, it is safe to assuming
that subjects did not remember their past choices, and that the random error term is
independent across sessions. Formally, we assume session independence, i.e., both ε+1





1 Under normality, this is equivalent to
assuming that the three pair correlations are zero.
We will also assume domain independence, i.e., ε+ and ε− are independent. Cohen
et al. (1987) provide evidence supporting this assumption.2 Assuming a zero corre-
lation will yield a conservative estimate of the proportion of reflective types in the
population.











p(τ ) × P(R+2 |τ) × P(R−2 |τ) × P(R+1 |τ) × P(R−1 |τ),
(6)
which together with (2) and (3) will be the base model to estimate the parameters
+,−, θ+, and θ−, and the probabilities p(τ ).
4 Experimental estimation of the SCM
4.1 Design
Our experimental design consisted of two sessions separated by a time interval of three
months. In each session, we measured the risk preferences in the domains of gains and
of losses separately. With the aim of estimating the proportions of different types in
an environment with error, we purposely chose a design that maximized instability in
responses. To do so, we used a single choice question in each domain. Having used a
battery of questions to estimate risk preferences would have reduced the noise due to
cancelation of errors. Furthermore, within-session errors could be positively correlated
by induced arbitrary coherence (Ariely et al. 2003). Each choice had two prospects
with the same expected values, and one of them being riskier in the sense of second-
order stochastic dominance. It was clear, but not immediately obvious, to determine
which prospect was less risky. Figure 2 contains the two questions of the experimental
design (Q1 for gains, Q2 for losses). For each question, subjects had three possible
1 Introducing positive correlation between ε+1 and ε
+




2 , would allow us to model
the notion of arbitrary coherence (Ariely et al. 2003). The idea is that the response noise is higher in the
first choice, and lower later on. One explanation is that subjects try to be coherent with their first answer,
even though this answer may be in itself unstable due to noise. Positive correlation between errors of sim-
ilar or identical questions in different sessions would be appropriate if the time interval between sessions
were short. In fact, we estimated a specification of the SCM that included positive correlation as follows:
ε2 = ρε1 +
√
1 − ρ2e2, where ε1 and e2 are iid N (0, 1). However, the correlation was not significant, and
the results did not differ from the specification with session independence.
2 The natural way to relax this assumption is to introduce positive correlation between the errors ε+ and
ε−. This increases the probability of choosing the same response in both domains, say, A+ and A−, even
though the true type might be reflective.
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Q1- Which of these two lotteries A or S would you prefer?
Quantities are in euros.
SA
x p x p
Q2- Which of these two lotteries S or A would you prefer?
You have no option other than S or A.
Quantities are in euros.
AS
x p x p










0 10% 0 50%






0 50% 0 10%
Question 1
A is preferred S is preferredA and S are the same
Question 2
S is preferred A is preferredS and A are the same
Fig. 2 Questionnaire of the experimental session
responses: A, N (neutral or indifferent), or S. In the experiment, the two prospects
were labeled F and G, respectively, to avoid the label influencing the choice.
Q2 is basically the same as Q1, but with the signs reversed. Notice that the best
and worst outcomes in A and S are the same. With this specification we seek to mini-
mize the distorting effect of the non-linear probability weighting function for extreme
probabilities. Hence, the answer to Q1 and Q2 provide both the risk attitude of the
subject, and the curvature-sign of the value function (see Baucells and Villasís (2008)
for evidence and discussion of this so-called equal tails method to elicit the value
function). Of course, using the same outcomes (in terms of absolute value) in Q1
and Q2 carries the risk that subjects may believe the questions are linked leading to
arbitrary coherence. This may have deflated support for the S-shaped utility function.3
3 It is possible to argue that our stimuli entail a bias toward s-shaped utility. For gains, A offers three gains
and S only one. It is well known from the psychological literature that alternatives that offer more positive
outcomes are more attractive, regardless of the probabilities. Hence, our design favored A for gains. A
symmetric argument then entails that for losses S will be more attractive than A because it has less negative
outcomes.
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Table 3 Comparison of the results of Session 1 and Session 2, the average of both sessions, and the average
values found in the literature (Table 2)
Gain–losses domain A+ A− A+N− A+S− N+ A− N+N− N+S− S+ A− S+N− S+S− n
Session 1 26 0 40 2 18 3 4 0 7 141
Session 2 25 2 53 0 6 1 10 0 3 141
Avg. Session 1 & 2 26 1 46 1 12 2 7 0 5 282
Avg. Table 2 20 7 47 2 3 3 7 2 9 360
Values are percentages
Ultimately, the assurance that our elicitation method is not biased is provided by the
fact that the proportion of subjects having the same risk attitude in both gains and
losses in our sample is similar to that obtained in the literature (see Table 2).
The subjects were 141 MBA students from IESE Business School (Barcelona) rep-
resenting more than 30 different countries. In the first session, Q1 and Q2 were part of
a larger questionnaire on biases in decision making. The first questionnaire was dis-
tributed at the beginning of the MBA program, and students seemed highly motivated
to respond. A total of 210 students completed this first questionnaire. The second ques-
tionnaire consisted exclusively on responding to Q1 and Q2. After three months, it is
safe to assume that most students did not remember their previous answers. Students
were explicitly told not to retrieve electronically the answer they gave in session one,
or, in case they remembered, to try to match the same answer. The order of questions
was the same in both cases, Q1 followed by Q2. In total, 141 subjects completed the
questionnaire in both sessions. Both questionnaires were distributed and collected via
e-mail. Given the difficulties of using real incentives in the losses domain, we decided
to carry out the experiment with hypothetical payoffs. Camerer and Hogarth (1999)
find small differences between using real vs. hypothetical incentives, except for less
risk seeking individuals when using real incentives.
4.2 Results
Table 3 exhibits the aggregate risk preferences separated for each session, the average
over the two sessions (third line), and the weighted average results from Table 2 (last
line). The reflection effect pattern A+S− is the most frequent in both sessions, and, as
in Table 2, it is slightly below 50%.
We now compare our results to those obtained in the literature to see if they are
similar. To do so, we perform a χ2 test. Table 4 (nine categories) shows that Session 1
is significantly different from Session 2. However, the average of Sessions 1 and 2 is
not significantly different from the average in Table 2. Session 1 is also different from
the average of Table 2. Session 1 is different from the other data mostly because of
the high number of risk neutral answers. Indeed, if we reconstruct Table 3 by evenly
splitting the neutral responses between A and S, then the χ2 test (Table 4, four cat-
egories) shows that Session 1 is not significantly different from Session 2, and the
average from the other results. In summary, we find proportion of neutral responses
that is larger than expected in Session 1. However, the average of Sessions 1 and 2 is
in line with previous results.
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Table 4 χ2 test for Session 1 and Session 2, the average of both sessions, and the average values of
Table 2
Comparison Nine categories Four categories
χ2 p-value χ2 p-value
Session 1 vs. Session 2 17.02 0.02 4.80 0.09
Avg. Session 1&2 vs. Avg. Table 2 14.53 0.07 0.89 0.64
Session 1 vs. Avg. Table 2 22.39 0.00 1.16 0.56
Session 2 vs. Avg. Table 2 13.2 0.11 3.28 0.19
Significant differences are in bold
Table 5 Risk attitudes across domains (the reflective answers A+S− are in bold )
1st\2nd A+2 A−2 A+2 N−2 A+2 S−2 N+2 A−2 N+2 N−2 N+2 S−2 S+2 A−2 S+2 N−2 S+2 S−2 Total
A+1 A
−






1 7 24 5 2 1 40
N+1 A
−
1 1 1 2
N+1 N
−
1 4 11 1 1 1 18
N+1 S
−
1 1 1 1 3
S+1 A
−






1 2 1 3 1 7
Total 25 2 53 0 6 1 10 0 3 100
Values are percentages (n=141)
To get a rough estimate of stability of preferences, we calculate the correlation
between responses by assigning the numerical values A = 1, N = 0, S = −1. The
correlation between the 282 responses to the same question in the two sessions is
ρ = 0.322 (p-value = 0.00). The correlation for the 141 gains domain questions is
ρ+ = 0.064 (p-value = 0.44), and for the 141 losses domain questions is ρ− = 0.204
(p-value = 0.02). While these coefficients are in line with the values reported in the
literature, the three estimates are very different.4
Besides correlation, another simple measure of stability could be the proportion of
subjects who give identical answers in both sessions. This can be seen in the diagonal
of Table 5, which provides the full distribution of responses in both sessions (notice
that the row total and the column total agree with Table 3). The subjects in the diagonal
are 37%, which is far from the 100% in a world with completely stable preferences.
In the gains 3 × 3 sub-matrix obtained by collapsing the responses from the losses
domain, the diagonal represents 56% of the population. Similarly, in the 3 × 3 matrix
corresponding to the losses domain the diagonal represents 48%.
4 It might be surprising that the overall correlation is higher than the correlations for gains and losses,
separately. In the gains domain, the most frequent answer is (1, 1), followed by (0, 1), (1, 0), (−1, 1), and
(1,−1), and not many (0, 0) or (−1,−1). This produces low correlation. Something similar occurs in the
losses domain. When we combine the data, we have many (1, 1) and (−1,−1) that yield a high correlation.
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Table 6 Results of the stochastic choice model
Specification MLE + − θ+ θ− LRT p-value
(a) Parameters
(1) +,−, θ+, θ− −483.8 0.98 0.67 0.29 0.21
(2) + = −, θ+ = θ− −485.4 0.92 0.25 3.36 0.19
(3) θ+ = θ− −485.0 0.95 0.71 0.25 2.49 0.11
(4) + = − −484.4 0.95 0.29 0.209 1.21 0.27
Specification a+a− a+n− a+s− n+a− n+n− n+s− s+a− s+n− s+s−
(b) Probability of types
(1) +,−, θ+, θ− 0.24 – 0.72 0.01 – – 0.03 – –
(2) + = −, θ+ = θ− 0.14 0.32 0.51 – – – 0.03 – –
(3) θ+ = θ− 0.25 – 0.72 0.01 – – 0.03 – –
(4) + = − 0.10 0.41 0.45 – – – 0.03 – –
Both correlation and diagonal counting are imperfect measures of stability. They
can give divergent results, as in our case where the gains domain is more stable than
the losses domain when measured by the diagonal counting, but the losses domain is
more stable than the gains domain when measured by correlation. Of course, diagonal
counting is highly dependent on the number of categories. In any case, both measures
indicate high instability of preferences, as the answers in the first session are a poor
predictor of the answers in the second session.
4.3 Estimation of the SCM parameters
The values in Table 5 are the inputs to estimate the parameters of the stochastic choice
model given in Eqs. 2, 3, and 6. In the basic specification of the model, we estimate the
probabilities p(τ ) and the four parameters +,−, θ+, and θ− with no additional
constraints. This will be called Specification 1.
The results of the MLE are given in Table 6a and b, first corresponding row. We
observe that + is higher than −. Recall that  is a measure of strength of prefer-
ence relative to the error term, and as such it measures stability of preferences. Hence,
preferences in the gains domain are more stable than in the losses domain. Still, one
has to keep in mind that the restricted model (+ = −) cannot be rejected, so that
the difference between + and − is statistically not large.
Lopes (1987) offers an explanation for higher instability in the losses domain.
She proposes a system in which the driving factors of risk attitudes are security
and aspiration. For our experiment, the A− alternative is attractive because it offers
a lower loss value (aspiration), but is disliked because it is almost certain (secu-
rity). The S− alternative is attractive because it offers a higher probability of zero
losses (security), but is disliked because of the higher probabilities of losing more
money (aspiration). This inverse ordering of security and aspiration causes a conflict
in losses.
Under the interpretation that N corresponds to undecided subjects with incom-
plete preferences, θ is a measure of incompleteness of preferences. Hence, at higher
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Table 7 Test of preference types
Hypothesis MLE + − θ+ θ− LRT p-value
(a) Parameters
(5) a+a− = 0 −485.0 0.99 0.88 0.29 0.19 2.54 0.11
(6) a+s− = 0 −494.3 1.00 1.10 0.29 0.17 21.01 0.00
(7) s+a− = 0 −484.1 1.00 0.66 0.29 0.21 0.66 0.42
(8) n+a− = 0 −483.8 0.97 0.67 0.29 0.21 0.02 0.87
Hypothesis a+a− a+n− a+s− n+a− n+n− n+s− s+a− s+n− s+s−
(b) Probability of types
(5) a+a− = 0 – 0.54 0.40 0.03 – – 0.03 – –
(6) a+s− = 0 – 0.92 – – – 0.06 0.02 – –
(7) s+a− = 0 0.20 – 0.72 0.08 – – – – –
(8) n+a− = 0 0.25 – 0.72 – – – 0.03 – –
θ , higher will be the probability that a subject will be unable to express preference
between A and S in either domain. Following this interpretation, our data suggest that
subjects have preferences that are more incomplete in gains than in losses domain.
Regarding the distribution of types (see Table 6b, line 1), we find that four types
have strictly positive probability, and only two of those have a probability above 5%.
The highest probability corresponds to the reflective type a+s−, with a value of 72%.
The second most frequent type is the risk averse, a+a−, with a fraction of 24%.
In Specification 2, we imposed the restrictions + = − and θ+ = θ−. The likeli-
hood ratio test (LRT) does not reject the hypothesis that the parameters in the restricted
model (Specification 2) are different from the parameters in the unrestricted model
(Specification 1). Hence, we cannot reject the joint hypothesis that the two param-
eters  and θ are constant across domains. Considering the restrictions separately,
θ+ = θ− in Specification 3 and + = − in Specification 4 yield similar results:
For all the three constrained specifications, the LRT rejects the hypothesis of domain
differences. In all cases, the type a+s− remains the most common. When we force
+ = − (Specifications 2 and 4), a new type that is averse for gains and neutral
for losses (a+n−) appears. Accordingly, the probabilities of the reflective and averse
types decrease.
Consider the four non-zero types identified in Specification 1. We test the hypothe-
sis that the probability of those types equals zero. Each corresponding line of Table 7a
and b reports the results of these constraints, imposed one at a time. The last column
of Table 7a shows that the reflective type a+s− stands as the only one necessary to
explain the behavior of the subjects in the experiment. When the a+a− type is forced
to zero, the neighboring type a+n− becomes the dominant preference type.
Three considerations follow from the results of this section: (1) The propensity
of subjects to be risk seeking for losses is not as strong as the propensity to be
risk averse for gains; (2) if restrictions are imposed (+ = −), then there is
certain evidence in favor of risk neutral preferences for the losses domain; and (3)
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Table 8 Probability of
obtaining an answer (row) given
a preference type (column) in
the gains domain (left) and the
losses domain (right)
In bold the cells where the
preference type match the
reported risk preference
P(R+|τ+) a+ n+ s+
A+ 75 39 10
N+ 14 23 14
S+ 10 39 75
Total 100 100 100
P(R−|τ−) a− n− s−
S− 68 42 19
N− 13 16 13
A− 19 42 68
Total 100 100 100
Specification 1 of the SCM recovers the original proportion of reflective types observed
in Table 1.
5 Using our estimates to make predictions
In this subsection we use the estimates from the Specification 1 of the SCM to make
predictions. The first prediction is the probability that a subject that belongs to a
specific preference type would report a certain risk preference (A, N , or S). We simply
apply Eqs. 2 and 3 using the results of Specification 1. Table 8 shows the probabilities
for the gains and losses domains, separately. The table is symmetric because we have
assumed that  is the same for all types. Note in Table 8 that there is greater sta-
bility in the gains domain, consistent with a higher value of + over −. Also, for
a risk neutral type, the low values of both θ+ and θ− make it more likely that he
would report, in both domains, an answer that is different from his true preference
(A or S).
The second prediction is the probability of belonging to a certain preference type
given some reported answer(s). We apply the Bayes rule using our estimates of p(τ ).
For example, the probability that a subject belongs to a certain type after completing
Session 1 is given by:
P(τ+, τ−|R+1 , R−1 ) =
P(R+1 , R
−





The estimation of the posterior probabilities of types given the possible answers in
Session 1 is given in Table 9. In each column, we indicate in bold the type that is most
likely, given the answer. Remarkably, the reflective type is always the most likely,
except when subjects report risk aversion in losses. In such a case, the best guess is
that the subject belongs to the a+a− type. In conclusion, the most likely a posteri-
ori types are either a+a− or a+s−. No other types are more likely, regardless of the
responses of the subjects.
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Table 9 Probabilities of types (row) given the answers (column)
P(τ+τ−|R+ R−) A+A− A+N− A+S− N+A− N+N− N+S− S+A− S+N− S+S−
a+a− 52 24 8 48 23 8 34 18 7
a+s− 45 75 91 42 72 90 29 59 84
s+a− 1 0 0 6 3 1 31 18 7
n+a− 1 1 0 4 2 1 7 4 2
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Proportion in
the experiment 25 1 47 1 12 2 7 0 5
Not all answers are equally discriminatory. For example, if we observe an answer
A+S−, we can say with a 91% probability that the subject belongs to the type
a+s−. In general, the answer having the most discriminatory power is exhibiting risk
seeking preference for losses. Given the answers A+S−, N+S−, or S+S− a subject
has a posterior probability of 91%, 90%, or 84%, respectively, of belonging to the
a+s− type.
After observing S+ A−, an answer consistent with type s+a−, one is left with a
high level of ambiguity about the true type. From Table 9 we see that the probability
that a subject with the answer S+ A− belongs to the type s+a− is roughly the same
(31%) as the probability of belonging to types a+a− (34%) and a+s− (29%).
In summary, the assessment of preferences for losses provides the most information
about the individual’s true risk preferences (for gains, everybody would be classified
as risk averse).
6 Discussion and conclusion
Few studies have focused on the stability of preferences by asking the same subjects
the same questions at two separate moments in time. In doing so, we learn that behind a
stable statistical pattern from session to session, there is a lot of instability in individual
preferences. We have analyzed the results in light of a stochastic choice model.
When cumulative prospect theory was initially presented, it was claimed that the
reflection effect holds for a vast majority (more than 70% of the subject). These per-
centages were the reported results for gains and losses separately. Subsequent studies
showed that the fraction of subjects that exhibit the reflection effect jointly in gains
and losses is around 50%. We also observe these joint percentages, but also observe
that 63% of all subjects change their risk preferences from session to session. Using a
SCM to study the stability of preferences, we learn that the fraction of subjects whose
true preferences agree with the reflection effect is around 72%, thus giving support to
the original estimates.
The estimation of the SCM also detects a significant fraction of subjects (24%)
that do not exhibit the reflection effect. These subjects are risk averse for both gains
and losses. This is important to interpret aggregated results. In decision under risk
it is common to report a representative value function that is calculated using the
average or median value of certainty equivalents. In doing so, one implicitly assumes
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that all subjects have the same value function, and the average or median calcula-
tion reduces the noise and estimates this common value function. The value func-
tions usually obtained are clearly concave for gains. For losses, however, the value
function is convex, but less than for gains (Abdellaoui 2000). Our empirical find-
ings of two prevalent types successfully explains this pattern. The clear concav-
ity for gains is obtained because both a+s− and a+a− types possess a concave
value function. For losses, the reduced convexity is the result of combining 72%
of a+s− having a convex value function with 24% of a+a− having a concave value
function.
The existence of two types has important implications in the area of elicitation of
risk preferences. For instance, in measuring the value function, rather than taking a
grand average of a “representative value function,” our results suggest to first classify
subjects as either reflective or averse, and then calculate two separate representative
value functions.
An alternative framework to a stochastic choice model is that of a random pref-
erence model (Loomes and Sugden 1995). Under this interpretation, the choices we
observe do not reflect some underlying stable preference together with an error. Instead,
decision makers possess multiple underlying preferences and a probability distribution
describing the frequency with which any of them will be expressed. The frequencies of
our data would directly estimate this probability distribution. This provides a “quantum
prospect theory” interpretation of the data. Accordingly, at the moment preferences are
elicited, any given individual has a 74% chance of appearing as risk averse, and a 64%
chance of appearing as risk seeking (see Table 1). If sufficient time has passed, then
a subsequent elicitation is an independent draw with same probabilities of 74% and
64%, respectively. Hence, we always observe a population percentage that is stable,
but the individuals behind each answer change from session to session. Moreover, it
follows that information about previous preferences of a given individual is not infor-
mative about future preferences of that individual, except for their statistical value to
describe aggregate choice.
In contrast, under the interpretation of the stochastic choice model, preferences
elicited in one session are predictive of future preferences, because they allow us to
update the probability that this subject belongs to a given type.
Slovic (1995) suggests that preferences are often constructed—not merely
revealed—in the elicitation process. The proposed SCM does not provide an answer to
the issue of preferences being preexistent to the decision process or built in the moment
of the decision. For instance, the preference type could correspond to a individual-
specific tendency to construct preferences in a given way, and the random error to
deviations from this tendency. Nevertheless, the model is most consistent with an inter-
pretation where types reflect one’s true underlying preference, and the error accounts
for imperfections in observing this true preference. However, the existence of true
types is an assumption, and our model estimates the proportion of types based on this
assumption.
Our results show that the correlation coefficients and the diagonal counting could
be ambiguous measures of stability. We propose to measure stability with the param-
eter , which is a standardized measure of the strength of preference relative to the
error.
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We propose that elicitation methods should be viewed within a sampling frame-
work. Subjects may belong to different preference types, and elicitation methods are
a sample with error from the true type. After the elicitation, we have an updated
probability of the subject belonging to different preference types. If more knowledge
about preferences is required, additional independent elicitation sessions should be
carried out to obtain more informative posterior probabilities of the true preference
type. Running elicitation procedures in separate sessions may help ensure indepen-
dence of the responses and errors. Elicitation methods that include multiple questions
in which subjects rethink each question from afresh (as opposed to responding in
coherence with previous question) may lead to a better assessment of underlying
preferences.
Acknowledgements Han Bleichrodt, Antoni Bosch-Domènech, Philippe Delquié, Franz Heukamp, Robin
Hogarth, and the participants of the Barcelona Economics Decision Group, gave many helpful comments.
Manel Baucells is also grateful to the Fundación BBVA for financial support.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
References
Abdellaoui, M. (2000). Parameter-free elicitation of utility and probability weighting functions.
Management Science, 46(11), 1497–1512.
Abdellaoui, M., Bleichrodt, H., & Paraschiv, C. (2007). Loss aversion under prospect theory: A parameter-
free measurement. Management Science, 53(10), 1659–1674.
Andersen, S., Harrison, G., Lau, M., & Rutstrom, E. (2008). Lost in state space: Are preferences stable?
International Economic Review, 49(3), 1091–1112.
Ariely, D., Loewenstein, G., & Prelec, D. (2003). “Coherent arbitrariness”: Stable demand curves without
stable preferences. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 73–105.
Ballinger, T., & Wilcox, N. (1997). Decisions, error and heterogeneity. Economic Journal, 107(443),
1090–1105.
Baucells, M., & Villasís, A. (2008). The equal tails: A method to elicit the value function. IESE Business
School Working paper.
Becker, G. M., Degroot, M. H., & Marschak, J. (1963). Stochastic models of choice behavior. Behavioral
Science, 1(8), 41–55.
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (2005). Risk preference instability across institutions: A dilemma.
PNAS, 102(11), 4209–4214.
Blavatskyy, P. R. (2006). Violations of betweenness or random errors?. Economics Letters, 91, 34–38.
Blavatskyy, P. R. (2007). Stochastic expected utility theory. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 34,
259–286.
Bostic, R., Herrnstein, R., & Luce, R. (1990). The effect on the preference-reversal phenomenon of using
choice indifferences. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 13(2), 193–212.
Buschena, D., & Zilberman, D. (2000). Generalized expected utility, heteroscedastic error, and path depen-
dence in risky choice. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 20, 67–88.
Camerer, C., & Ho, T. (1994). Violations of the betweenness axiom and nonlinearity in probability. Journal
of Risk and Uncertainty, 8, 167–196.
Camerer, C., & Hogarth, R. (1999). The effects of financial incentives in experiments: A review and
capital-labor-production framework. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 19(1–3), 7–42.
Camerer, C. F. (1989). An experimental test of several generalized utility theories. Journal of Risk and
Uncertainty, 2(1), 61–104.
123
Stability of risk preferences 211
Cohen, M., Jaffray, J. Y., & Said, T. (1987). Experimental comparison of individual behavior under risk and
under uncertainty for gains and for losses. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,
39, 1–22.
Fennema, H., & Van Assen, M. (1998). Measuring the utility of losses by means of the trade-off method.
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 17(3), 277–295.
Fishburn, P. C., & Kochenberger, G. A. (1979). Two-piece Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions.
Decision Sciences, 10, 503–518.
Gonzalez, C., Dana, J., Koshino, H., & Just, M. (2005). The framing effect and risky decisions: Examining
cognitive functions with fMRI. Journal of Economic Psychology, 26(26), 1–20.
Grether, D. M., & Plott, C. R. (1979). Economic-theory of choice and the preference reversal phenomenon.
American Economic Review, 69(4), 623–638.
Harless, D.,& Camerer, C. (1994). The predictive utility of generalized expected utility theories. Econome-
trica, 62(6), 1251–1289.
Harrison, G., Johnson, E., McInnes, M., & Rutstrom, E. (2005). Temporal stability of estimates of risk
aversion. Applied Financial Economic Letters, 1(1), 31–35.
Hershey, J., & Schoemaker, P. (1980). Prospect theory’s reflection hypothesis: A critical examination.
Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 25, 395–418.
Hershey, J., & Schoemaker, P. (1985). Probability versus certainty equivalence methods in utility measure-
ment—are they equivalent. Management Science, 31(10), 1213–1231.
Hey, J., & Orme, C. (1994). Investigating generalizations of expected utility-theory using experimental-data.
Econometrica, 62(6), 1291–1326.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica,
47(2), 263–292.
Laury, S., & Holt, C. (2005). Further reflections on prospect theory. Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
Research Paper Series No.06-11.
Lichtenstein, S., & Slovic P. (1971). Reversals of preference between bids and choices in gambling decisions.
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 89(1), 46–55.
Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1995). Incorporating a stochastic element into decision theories. European
Economic Review, 39(3–4), 641–648.
Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1998). Testing different stochastic specifications of risky choice. Economica,
65(260), 581–598.
Lopes, L. (1987). Between hope and fear: The psychology of risk. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in
experimental social psychology (Vol. 20, pp. 255–295). San Diego: Academic Press.
Machina, M. J. (1985). Stochastic choice functions generated from deterministic preferences over lotteries.
Economic Journal, 95(379), 575–594.
Schoemaker, P. (1990). Are risk-attitudes related across domains and response-modes. Management Sci-
ence, 36(12), 1451–1463.
Schoemaker, P., & Hershey, J. (1992). Utility measurement—signal, noise, and bias. Organizational Behav-
ior And Human Decision Processes, 52(3), 397–424.
Slovic, P. (1995). The construction of preference. American Psychologist, 50(5), 364–371.
Smidts, A. (1997). The relationship between risk attitude and strength of preference: A test of intrinsic risk
attitude. Management Science, 43(3), 357–370.
Sopher, B., & Narramore, J. (2000). Stochastic choice and consistency in decision making under risk: An
experimental study. Theory and Decision, 48(4), 323–350.
Suppes, P., Krantz, D., Luce, D., & Tversky, A. (1989). Foundations of measurement (Vol. II). San Diego:
Academic Press.
Tversky, A. (1969). Intransitivity of preferences. Psychological Review, 76(1), 31–48.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncer-
tainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 297–323.
Wehrung, D. A., Maccrimmon, K. R., & Brothers, K. M. (1984). Utility-assessment—domains, stability,
and equivalence procedures. Infor, 22(2), 98–115.
123
